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Abstract
In a data poisoning attack, an attacker modifies, deletes, and/or inserts some train-
ing examples to corrupt the learnt machine learning model. Bootstrap Aggregating
(bagging) is a well-known ensemble learning method, which trains multiple base
models on random subsamples of a training dataset using a base learning algorithm
and uses majority vote to predict labels of testing examples. We prove the intrinsic
certified robustness of bagging against data poisoning attacks. Specifically, we
show that bagging with an arbitrary base learning algorithm provably predicts the
same label for a testing example when the number of modified, deleted, and/or
inserted training examples is bounded by a threshold. Moreover, we show that
our derived threshold is tight if no assumptions on the base learning algorithm are
made. We empirically evaluate our method on MNIST and CIFAR10. For instance,
our method can achieve a certified accuracy of 70.8% on MNIST when arbitrarily
modifying, deleting, and/or inserting 100 training examples.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models trained on user-provided data are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks [30,
6, 41, 23, 35, 34], in which malicious users carefully poison (i.e., modify, delete, and/or insert)
some training examples such that the learnt model is corrupted and makes predictions for testing
examples as an attacker desires. In particular, the corrupted model predicts incorrect labels for
a large fraction of testing examples indiscriminately (i.e., a large testing error rate) or for some
attacker-chosen testing examples. Unlike adversarial examples [37, 10], which carefully perturb
each testing example such that a model predicts an incorrect label for the perturbed testing example,
data poisoning attacks corrupt the model such that it predicts incorrect labels for many clean testing
examples. Like adversarial examples, data poisoning attacks pose severe security threats to machine
learning systems.
To mitigate data poisoning attacks, various defenses [13, 3, 36, 38, 17, 19, 25, 32] have been proposed
in the literature. Most of these defenses [13, 3, 36, 38, 17, 19] achieve empirical robustness against
certain data poisoning attacks and are often broken by strong adaptive attacks. To end the cat-and-
mouse game between attackers and defenders, certified defenses [25, 32] were proposed. We say
a learning algorithm is certifiably robust against data poisoning attacks if it can learn a classifier
that provably predicts the same label for a testing example when the number of poisoned training
examples is bounded. For instance, Ma et al. [25] showed that a classifier trained with differential
privacy certifies robustness against data poisoning attacks. Rosenfeld et al. [32] leveraged randomized
smoothing [12], which was originally designed to certify robustness against adversarial examples,
to certify robustness against a particular type of data poisoning attacks called label flipping attacks,
which only flip the labels of existing training examples. This randomized smoothing based defense
can also be generalized to certify robustness against data poisoning attacks that modify both features
and labels of existing training examples. However, these certified defenses suffer from two major
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Figure 1: An example to illustrate why bagging is robust against data poisoning attacks, where
(x5,y5) is the poisoned training example, N = 3, and k = 2. Base classifiers f1 and f2 are
trained using clean training examples and bagging predicts the correct label for a testing ex-
ample after majority vote among the three base classifiers.
limitations. First, they are only applicable to limited scenarios, i.e., Ma et al. [25] is limited to learning
algorithms that can be differentially private, while Rosenfeld et al. [32] is limited to data poisoning
attacks that only modify existing training examples. Second, their certified robustness guarantees
are loose, meaning that a learning algorithm is certifiably more robust than their guarantees indicate.
We note that Steinhardt et al. [35] derives an approximate upper bound of the loss function for data
poisoning attacks. However, their method cannot certify that the learnt model predicts the same label
for a testing example.
We aim to address these limitations in this work. Our approach is based on a well-known ensemble
learning method called Bootstrap Aggregating (bagging) [9]. Given a training dataset, bagging first
generatesN subsamples by sampling from the training dataset with replacement uniformly at random,
where each subsample includes k training examples. Then, bagging uses a base learning algorithm to
train a base classifier on each subsample. Given a testing example, bagging uses each base classifier
to predict its label and takes majority vote among the predicted labels as the final predicted label.
We show that bagging with any base learning algorithm is certifiably robust against data poisoning
attacks. Figure 1 shows a toy example to illustrate why bagging certifies robustness against data
poisoning attacks. When the poisoned training examples are minority in the training dataset, the
sampled k training examples do not include any poisoned training examples with a high probability.
Therefore, a majority of the N base classifiers in bagging and bagging’s predicted labels for testing
examples are not influenced by the poisoned training examples. Formally, we show that bagging
predicts the same label for a testing example when the number of poisoned training examples is
no larger than a threshold. We call the threshold certified poisoning size. Moreover, we show that
our derived certified poisoning size is tight if no assumptions on the base learning algorithm are
made. Our certified poisoning size is the optimal solution to an optimization problem and we design
an efficient algorithm to solve the optimization problem. We also empirically evaluate our method
on MNIST and CIFAR10. For instance, our method can achieve a certified accuracy of 70.8% on
MNIST when 100 training examples are arbitrarily poisoned, where k = 100 and N = 1, 000. Under
the same setting, Ma et al. [25] and Rosenfeld et al. [32] achieve 0 certified accuracy. Finally, we
show that training the base classifiers using transfer learning can significantly improve the certified
accuracy.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We derive the first intrinsic certified robustness of bagging against data poisoning attacks
and prove the tightness of our robustness guarantee.
• We develop an efficient algorithm to compute the certified poisoning size in practice.
• We empirically evaluate our method on MNIST and CIFAR10.
All the proofs to our theorems are shown in the Supplemental Material.
2
2 Certified Robustness of Bagging against Data Poisoning Attacks
Assuming we have a training datasetD = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn)} with n examples, where
xi and yi are the feature vector and label of the ith training example, respectively. Moreover, we are
given an arbitrary deterministic or randomized base learning algorithm A, which takes a training
dataset D as input and outputs a classifier f , i.e., f = A(D). f(x) is the predicted label for a testing
example x. For convenience, we jointly represent the training and testing processes as A(D,x),
which is x’s label predicted by a classifier that is trained using algorithm A and training dataset D.
Data poisoning attacks: In a data poisoning attack, an attacker poisons the training dataset D
such that the learnt classifier makes predictions for testing examples as the attacker desires. In
particular, the attacker can carefully modify, delete, and/or insert some training examples in D such
that A(D,x) 6= A(D′,x) for many testing examples x or some attacker-chosen x, where D′ is the
poisoned training dataset. We note that modifying a training example means modifying its feature
vector and/or label. We denote the set of poisoned training datasets with at most r poisoned training
examples as follows:
B(D, r) = {D′|max{|D|, |D′|} − |D ∩ D′| ≤ r}. (1)
Intuitively, max{|D|, |D′|} − |D ∩ D′| is the minimum number of modified/deleted/inserted training
examples that can change D to D′. For simplicity, we denote n = |D|, n′ = |D′|, and m = |D ∩D′|,
where m is the number of training examples that are in both D and D′.
Bootstrap aggregating (Bagging) [9]: Bagging is a well-known ensemble learning method. Roughly
speaking, bagging creates many subsamples of a training dataset with replacement and trains a
classifier on each subsample. For a testing example, bagging uses each classifier to predict its
label and takes majority vote among the predicted labels as the label of the testing example. Next,
we describe a probabilistic view of bagging, which makes it possible to theoretically analyze the
certified robustness of bagging against data poisoning attacks. Specifically, we denote by g(D) a
list of k examples that are sampled from D with replacement uniformly at random. Since g(D) is
random, the predicted label A(g(D),x) is also random. We denote by pj = Pr(A(g(D),x) = j) the
label probability for label j, where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c}. Bagging predicts the label with the largest
label probability for x, i.e., h(D,x) =argmaxj∈{1,2,··· ,c} pj is the label that bagging predicts for x.
h(D′,x) is the label that bagging predicts for x when the training dataset is poisoned.
Certified robustness of bagging: We show the certified robustness of bagging. In particular, we
show that bagging predicts the same label for a testing example when the number of poisoned training
examples is no larger than some threshold (called certified poisoning size). Moreover, we show that
our derived certified poisoning size is tight. Our major theoretical results are summarized in the
following two theorems.
Theorem 1 (Certified Poisoning Size of Bagging). Suppose we have a training dataset D, a base
learning algorithm A, and a testing example x. g(D) is a list of k training examples sampled from D
uniformly at random with replacement. l, s, pl ∈ [0, 1], and ps ∈ [0, 1] satisfy the following:
Pr(A(g(D),x) = l) ≥ pl ≥ ps ≥ max
j 6=l
Pr(A(g(D),x) = j), (2)
where l and s are the labels with the largest and second largest probabilities under bagging, respec-
tively. pl is a lower bound of the largest label probability, while ps is an upper bound of the second
largest label probability. Then, bagging predicts label l for x when the number of poisoned training
examples is bounded by r∗, i.e., we have:
h(D′,x) = l,∀D′ ∈ B(D, r∗), (3)
where r∗ is called certified poisoning size and is the solution to the following optimization problem:
r∗ = argmax
r
r
s.t. max
n−r≤n′≤n+r
(
n′
n
)k − 2 · (max(n, n
′)− r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs) < 0, (4)
where n = |D|, n′ = |D′|, δl = pl− (bpl ·nkc)/nk, and δs = (dps ·nke)/nk − ps. n+ r and n− r
are respectively the maximum and minimum sizes of the poisoned training dataset when the number
of poisoned training examples is r.
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Given Theorem 1, we have the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. Suppose a data poisoning attack only modifies existing training examples. Then, we
have n′ = n and the solution to optimization problem (4) is r∗ = dn · (1− k
√
1− pl−ps−δl−δs2 )− 1e.
Corollary 2. Suppose a data poisoning attack only deletes existing training examples. Then, we
have n′ = m and r∗ = dn · (1− k
√
1− (pl − ps − δl − δs))− 1e.
Corollary 3. Suppose a data poisoning attack only inserts new training examples. Then, we have
m = n and r∗ = dn · ( k
√
1 + (pl − ps − δl − δs)− 1)− 1e.
Theorem 2 (Tightness of the Certified Poisoning Size). Assuming we have pl + ps ≤ 1, pl + (c−
1) · ps ≥ 1, and δl = δs = 0. Then, for any r > r∗, there exist a base learning algorithm A∗
consistent with (2) and a poisoned training dataset D′ with r poisoned training examples such that
argmaxj∈{1,2,··· ,c} Pr(A∗(g(D′),x) = j) 6= l or there exist ties.
We have several remarks about our theorems.
Remark 1: Our Theorem 1 is applicable for any base learning algorithm A. In other words, bagging
with any base learning algorithm is provably robust against data poisoning attacks.
Remark 2: For any lower bound pl of the largest label probability and upper bound ps of the second
largest label probability, our Theorem 1 derives a certified poisoning size. In particular, our certified
poisoning size is related to the gap between the two probability bounds. If we can estimate tighter
probability bounds, then we may certify a larger poisoning size. We use the probability bounds
instead of the exact label probabilities pl and ps, because it is challenging to exactly compute them.
Remark 3: Theorem 2 shows that when no assumptions on the base learning algorithm are made, it
is impossible to certify a poisoning size that is larger than ours.
3 Computing the Certified Poisoning Size
Given a learning algorithmA, a training datasetD, parameter k, and e testing examples inDe, we aim
to estimate the predicted label and certified poisoning size for each testing example. Specifically, for
a testing example, our certified poisoning size relies on a lower bound of the largest label probability
and an upper bound of the second largest label probability. Therefore, we use a Monte-Carlo method
to estimate these probability bounds with a probabilistic guarantee. Next, we describe estimating the
probability bounds, solving the optimization problem in (4) using the probability bounds, and our
complete certification algorithm.
Estimating probability bounds pl and ps: One way to estimate pl and ps is to use the Monte-
Carlo method proposed by [12]. In particular, pl is estimated using the one-sided Clopper-Pearson
method [11] and ps is estimated as 1 − pl. However, such estimated ps may be loose. To
address the challenge, we adopt the simultaneous confidence interval estimation method called
SimuEM [20] to estimate pl and ps simultaneously. Specifically, we first randomly sample N sub-
samples L1,L2, · · · ,LN fromD with replacement, each of which has k training examples. Then, we
train a classifier fo for each subsample Lo using the learning algorithm A, where o = 1, 2, · · · , N .
We can use the N classifiers to estimate the predicted label l, pl, and ps for x with a confidence level
at least 1 − α. A naive procedure is to train such N classifiers for each testing example, which is
very computationally expensive. To address the computational challenge, we propose to train such N
classifiers for each e testing examples. Our key idea is to divide the confidence level among e testing
examples such that we can estimate their predicted labels and certified poisoning sizes using the same
N classifiers with a simultaneous confidence level at least 1− α.
Specifically, for each testing example xi in De, we count the frequency of each label predicted
by the N classifiers, i.e., nj =
∑N
o=1 I(fo(xi) = j), where I is the indicator function. Each nj
follows a binomial distribution with parameters N and pj . Thus, we can adopt the Clopper-Pearson
method to obtain a one-sided confidence interval for each label probability pj . Then, we can leverage
Bonferroni correction to obtain simultaneous confidence intervals for all label probabilities. Formally,
we estimate l as the label with the largest frequency nl and we have the following probability
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Algorithm 1 CERTIFY
Input: A, D, k, N , De, α.
Output: Predicted label and certified poisoning size for each testing example.
f1, f2, · · · , fN ← TRAINUNDERSAMPLE(A,D, k,N)
for xi in De do
counts[j]←∑No=1 I(fo(xi) = j), j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c}
li, si ← top two indices in counts (ties are broken uniformly at random).
pli , psi ← SIMUEM(counts, αe )
if pli > psi then
yˆi ← li
rˆ∗i ← BINARYSEARCH(pli , psi , k, |D|)
else
yˆi, rˆ
∗
i ← ABSTAIN,ABSTAIN
end if
end for
return yˆ1, yˆ2, · · · , yˆe and rˆ∗1 , rˆ∗2 , · · · , rˆ∗e
bounds [20]:
pl = Beta(
α/e
c
;nl, N − nl + 1) (5)
pj = Beta(1−
α/e
c
;nj , N − nj + 1),∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l}, (6)
where 1− α/e is the confidence level and Beta(β;λ, θ) is the βth quantile of the Beta distribution
with shape parameters λ and θ. One natural method to estimate ps is that ps = maxj 6=l pj . However,
this bound may be loose. For example, pl + ps may be larger than 1. Therefore, we estimate ps as
ps = min(maxj 6=l pj , 1− pl).
Computing the certified poisoning size: Given the estimated label probability bounds for a testing
example, we solve the optimization problem in (4) to obtain its certified poisoning size r∗. We
design an efficient binary search based method to solve r∗. Specifically, we use binary search to
find the largest r such that the constraint in (4) is satisfied. We denote the left-hand side of the
constraint as maxn−r≤n′≤n+r L(n). For a given r, a naive way to check whether the constraint
maxn−r≤n′≤n+r L(n′) < 0 holds is to check whether L(n′) < 0 holds for each n′ in the range
[n− r, n+ r], which could be inefficient when r is large. To reduce the computation cost, we derive
the following analytical form of n′ at which L(n′) reaches its maximum value for a given r:
argmax
n−r≤n′≤n+r
L(n′) =

n, if r ≤ n · (1− k−1
√
1
2 )
n+ r, if r ≥ n · ( k−1√2− 1)
d r
1− k−1
√
1
2
e or b r
1− k−1
√
1
2
c, otherwise.
(7)
Therefore, for a given r, we only need to check whether L(n′) < 0 holds for at most two different n′.
The details of deriving (7) are shown in Supplemental Material.
Complete certification algorithm: Algorithm 1 shows our certification process to estimate the
predicted labels and certified poisoning sizes for e testing examples in De. The function TRAIN-
UNDERSAMPLE randomly samples N subsamples and trains N classifiers. The function SIMUEM
estimates the probability bounds pli and psi . The function BINARYSEARCH solves the optimization
problem in (4) to obtain the certified poisoning size rˆ∗i for testing example xi. Roughly speaking,
the following theorem shows that, with probability at least 1− α, if CERTIFY does not ABSTAIN,
then it returns a valid certified poisoning size, for every testing example in De. In other words, the
probability that CERTIFY returns an incorrect certified poisoning size for at least one testing example
is at most α.
Theorem 3. Algorithm CERTIFY has the following probabilistic guarantee:
Pr(∩xi∈De((∀D′ ∈ B(D, rˆ∗i ), h(D′,xi) = yˆi)|yˆi 6= ABSTAIN)) ≥ 1− α. (8)
5
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and classifiers: We perform experiments on MNIST and CIFAR10. The base learning
algorithm is neural network, and we use the example neural network architectures12 in Keras for
the two datasets. The number of training examples in the two datasets are 60, 000 and 50, 000,
respectively, which are the training datasets that we aim to certify. Both datasets have 10,000 testing
examples, which are the De in our algorithm.
Evaluation metric: We use certified accuracy as our evaluation metric. In particular, for a given r
(i.e., number of poisoned training examples), the certified accuracy can be computed as follows:
CAr =
∑
xi∈De I(yˆi = yi) · I(rˆ∗i ≥ r)
|De| , (9)
where yi is the ground truth label for testing example xi, and yˆi and rˆ∗i respectively are the predicted
label and certified poisoning size returned by our CERTIFY algorithm for xi. Intuitively, the certified
accuracy is the fraction of testing examples whose labels are correctly predicted and whose certified
poisoning sizes are no smaller than r. In other words, when the number of poisoned training examples
is r, bagging’s testing accuracy for De is at least CAr with a confidence level 1− α.
Parameter setting: Our method has three parameters, i.e., k, α, and N . Unless otherwise mentioned,
we adopt the following default settings for them: k = 100, α = 0.001, and N = 1, 000 for MNIST;
and k = 1, 000, α = 0.001, and N = 1, 000 for CIFAR10. In our experiments, we will study the
impact of each parameter while setting the remaining parameters to their default values. Note that
training the N classifiers can be easily parallelized. We performed experiments on a server with 80
CPUs@2.1GHz, 8 GPUs (RTX 6,000), and 385 GB main memory.
Compared methods: We compare with a differential privacy based method [25] and a randomized
smoothing based method [32]. Since these methods are not scalable because they train N classifiers
on the entire training dataset, we perform comparisons on the MNIST 1/7 dataset that just consists of
the digits 1 and 7. This subset includes 13,007 training examples and 2,163 testing examples.
• Ma et al. [25]. Ma et al. [25] showed that a classifier trained with differential privacy
achieves certified robustness against data poisoning attacks. Suppose ACCr is the testing
accuracy on De of a differentially private classifier that is trained using a poisoned training
dataset with r poisoned training examples. Based on the Theorem 3 in [25] (i.e., via
treating the testing accuracy as their cost function), we have the expected testing accuracy
E(ACCr) is lower bounded by a certain function of E(ACC), r, and (, δ) (the function
can be found in their Theorem 3), where E(ACC) is the expected testing accuracy of a
differentially private classifier that is trained using the clean training dataset and (, δ) are
the differential privacy parameters. The randomness in E(ACCr) and E(ACC) are from
differential privacy. This lower bound is the certified accuracy that the method achieves.
A lower bound of E(ACC) can be further estimated with confidence level 1 − α via
training N differentially private classifiers on the entire clean training dataset. However, for
simplicity, we estimate E(ACC) as the average testing accuracies of the N differentially
private classifiers, which gives advantages for this method. We use DP-SGD [1]3 to train
differentially private classifiers. Moreover, we set  = 0.3 and δ = 10−5 such that this
method and our method achieve comparable certified accuracies when r = 0.
• Rosenfeld et al. [32]. Rosenfeld [32] proposed a randomized smoothing based method to
certify robustness against label flipping attacks, which only flip the labels of existing training
examples. This method can be generalized to certify robustness against data poisoning
attacks that modify both features and labels of existing training examples via randomly
flipping both features and labels of training examples. In particular, we binarize the features
to apply this method. Like our method, they also train N classifiers to estimate the certified
accuracy with a confidence level 1 − α.4 However, unlike our method, when training a
1https://keras.io/examples/mnist_cnn/
2https://keras.io/examples/cifar10_cnn/
3https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
4Their method only needs one classifier when label flipping attacks and linear classifiers are considered.
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Figure 2: Impact of k, α, and N on the certified accuracy of our method. The first row is the
result on MNIST and the second row is the result on CIFAR10.
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Figure 3: (a) Transfer learning improves our certified accuracy on CIFAR10. Comparing our
method with existing methods with respect to (b) certified accuracy and (c) running time.
classifier, they flip each feature/label value in the training dataset with probability β and use
the entire noisy training dataset. When predicting the label of a testing example, this method
takes a majority vote among the N classifiers. We set β = 0.3 such that this method and
our method achieve comparable certified accuracies when r = 0. We note that this method
certifies the number of poisoned features/labels in the training dataset. We transform this
certificate to the number of poisoned training examples as b Fd+1c, where F is the certified
number of features/labels and d+ 1 is the number of features/label of a training example (d
features + one label). We have d = 784 for MNIST.
4.2 Experimental Results
Impact of k, α, and N : Figure 2 shows the impact of k, α, and N on the certified accuracy of
our method. As the results show, k controls a tradeoff between accuracy under no poisoning and
robustness. Specifically, when k is larger, our method has a higher accuracy when there are no data
poisoning attacks (i.e., r = 0) but the certified accuracy drops more quickly as the number of poisoned
training examples increases. The reason is that a larger k makes it more likely to sample poisoned
training examples when creating the subsamples in bagging. The certified accuracy increases as α or
N increases. The reason is that a larger α or N produces tighter estimated probability bounds, which
make the certified poisoning sizes larger. We also observe that the certified accuracy is relatively
insensitive to α.
Transfer learning improves certified accuracy: Our method trains multiple classifiers and each
classifier is trained using k training examples. Improving the accuracy of each classifier can improve
the certified accuracy. We explore using transfer learning to train more accurate classifiers. Specifi-
cally, we use the Inception-v3 classifier pretrained on ImageNet to extract features and we leverage a
public implementation5 to train our classifiers on CIFAR10. Figure 3(a) shows that transfer learning
can significantly increase our certified accuracy, where k = 100, α = 0.001, and N = 1, 000.
5https://github.com/alexisbcook/keras_transfer_cifar10
7
Comparing with Ma et al. [25] and Rosenfeld et al. [32]: Figure 3(b) compares our method with
previous methods on the MNIST 1/7 dataset, where k = 50, α = 0.001, and N = 1, 000. Our
method significantly outperforms existing methods. For example, our method can achieve 96.95%
certified accuracy when the number of poisoned training examples is r = 50, while the certified
accuracy is 0 under the same setting for the two existing methods. Figure 3(c) shows that our method
is also more efficient than existing methods. The reason is that our method trains classifiers on a
small number of training examples while existing methods train classifiers on the entire training
dataset. Ma et al. [25] outperforms Rosenfeld et al. [32] because differential privacy directly certifies
robustness against modification/deletion/insertion of training examples while randomized smoothing
was designed to certify robustness against modifications of features/labels.
5 Related Work
Data poisoning attacks carefully modify, delete, and/or insert some training examples in the training
dataset such that a learnt model makes incorrect predictions for many testing examples indiscrimi-
nately (i.e., the learnt model has a large testing error rate) or for some attacker-chosen testing exam-
ples. For instance, data poisoning attacks have been shown to be effective for Bayes classifiers [30],
SVMs [6], neural networks [42, 29, 36, 34], linear regression models [27, 19], PCA [33], LASSO [41],
collaborative filtering [23, 43, 16, 15], clustering [7, 8], graph-based methods [46, 40, 21, 44], fed-
erated learning [14, 4, 2], and others [28, 26, 22, 45]. We note that backdoor attacks [18, 24] also
poison the training dataset. However, unlike data poisoning attacks, backdoor attacks also inject
perturbation (i.e., a trigger) to testing examples.
One category of defenses [13, 3, 36, 38] aim to detect the poisoned training examples based on their
negative impact on the error rate of the learnt model. Another category of defenses [17, 19] aim
to design new loss functions, solving which detects the poisoned training examples and learns a
model simultaneously. For instance, Jagielski et al. [19] proposed to jointly optimize the selection of
a subset of training examples with a given size and a model that minimizes the loss function; and
the unselected training examples are treated as poisoned ones. Steinhardt et al. [35] assumes that a
model is trained only using examples in a feasible set and derives an approximate upper bound of the
loss function for any data poisoning attacks under these assumptions. However, all of these defenses
cannot certify that the learnt model predicts the same label for a testing example under data poisoning
attacks.
Ma et al. [25] shows that differentially private models certify robustness against data poisoning
attacks. Rosenfeld et al. [32] leverages randomized smoothing to certify robustness against label
flipping attacks, which can be generalized to certify robustness against data poisoning attacks that
modify both features and labels of existing training examples. Wang et al. [39] proposes to use
randomized smoothing to certify robustness against backdoor attacks, which is also applicable to
certify robustness against data poisoning attacks. However, these defenses achieve loose certified
robustness guarantees. Moreover, Ma et al. [25] is only applicable to learning algorithms that can
be differentially private, while Rosenfeld et al. [32] and Wang et al. [39] are only applicable to data
poisoning attacks that modify existing training examples. Biggio et al. [5] proposed bagging as an
empirical defense against data poisoning attacks. However, they did not derive the certified robustness
of bagging.
6 Conclusion
Data poisoning attacks pose severe security threats to machine learning systems via poisoning the
training dataset. In this work, we show the intrinsic certified robustness of bagging against data
poisoning attacks, i.e., bagging can transform any learning algorithm to be certifiably robust against
data poisoning attacks. Specifically, we show that bagging predicts the same label for a testing
example when the number of poisoned training examples is bounded. Moreover, we show that our
derived bound is tight if no assumptions on the learning algorithm are made. We also empirically
demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using MNIST and CIFAR10. Our results show that our
method achieves much better certified robustness and is more efficient than existing certified defenses.
Interesting future work includes: 1) generalizing our method to other types of data, e.g., graphs, and
2) improving our method by leveraging meta-learning.
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Broader Impact
Data poisoning attacks are basic security threats to machine learning, limiting its applications in
security-critical domains such as self-driving cars, precision health, and cybersecurity. Our work
certifies robustness against data poisoning attacks and has the potentials to broaden the applications
of machine learning in such security-critical domains.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We first define some notations that will be used in our proof. Given a training dataset D and its
poisoned version D′, we define the following two random variables:
X = g(D) (10)
Y = g(D′), (11)
where X and Y respectively are two random lists with k examples sampled from D and D′ with
replacement uniformly at random. We denote by I = D∩D′ the set of overlapping training examples
in the two datasets. We use Ω to denote the space of random lists g(D∪D′), i.e., each element in Ω is
a list with k examples sampled from D∪D′ with replacement uniformly at random. For convenience,
we define operators v, 6v as follows:
Definition 1 (v, 6v). Assuming ω ∈ Ω is a list of k examples and S is a set of examples, we say
ω v S if ∀w ∈ ω,w ∈ S. We say ω 6v S if ∃w ∈ ω,w 6∈ S.
For instance, we have X v D and Y v D′. Before proving our theorem, we show a variant of the
Neyman-Pearson Lemma [31] that will be used in our proof.
Lemma 1 (Neyman-Pearson Lemma). Suppose X and Y are two random variables in the space
Ω with probability distributions µx and µy, respectively. Let M : Ω −→ {0, 1} be a random or
deterministic function. Then, we have the following:
• If S1 = {ω ∈ Ω : µx(ω) > t · µy(ω)} and S2 = {ω ∈ Ω : µx(ω) = t · µy(ω)} for some
t > 0. Let S = S1 ∪ S3, where S3 ⊆ S2. If we have Pr(M(X) = 1) ≥ Pr(X ∈ S), then
Pr(M(Y ) = 1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ S).
• If S1 = {ω ∈ Ω : µx(ω) < t · µy(ω)} and S2 = {ω ∈ Ω : µx(ω) = t · µy(ω)} for some
t > 0. Let S = S1 ∪ S3, where S3 ⊆ S2. If we have Pr(M(X) = 1) ≤ Pr(X ∈ S), then
Pr(M(Y ) = 1) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ S).
Proof. We show the proof of the first part, and the second part can be proved similarly. For simplicity,
we use M(1|ω) and M(0|ω) to denote the probabilities that M(ω) = 0 and M(ω) = 1, respectively.
We use Sc to denote the complement of S, i.e., Sc = Ω \ S. We have the following:
Pr(M(Y ) = 1)− Pr(Y ∈ S) (12)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
M(1|ω) · µy(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
µy(ω) (13)
=
∑
ω∈Sc
M(1|ω) · µy(ω) +
∑
ω∈S
M(1|ω) · µy(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(1|ω) · µy(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(0|ω) · µy(ω)
(14)
=
∑
ω∈Sc
M(1|ω) · µy(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(0|ω) · µy(ω) (15)
≥1
t
· (
∑
ω∈Sc
M(1|ω) · µx(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(0|ω) · µx(ω)) (16)
=
1
t
· (
∑
ω∈Sc
M(1|ω) · µx(ω) +
∑
ω∈S
M(1|ω) · µx(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(1|ω) · µx(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
M(0|ω) · µx(ω))
(17)
=
1
t
· (
∑
ω∈Ω
M(1|ω) · µx(ω)−
∑
ω∈S
µx(ω)) (18)
=
1
t
· (Pr(M(X) = 1)− Pr(X ∈ S)) (19)
≥0. (20)
We obtain (17) from (15) because µx(ω) ≥ t · µy(ω),∀ω ∈ S and µx(ω) ≤ t · µy(ω),∀ω ∈ Sc. We
have the last inequality because Pr(M(X) = 1) ≥ Pr(X ∈ S).
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Next, we prove our Theorem 1. Our goal is to show that h(D′,x) = l, i.e., Pr(A(Y,x) = l) >
maxj 6=l Pr(A(Y,x) = j). Our key idea is to derive a lower bound of Pr(A(Y,x) = l) and an upper
bound of maxj 6=l Pr(A(Y,x) = j), where the lower bound and upper bound can be easily computed.
We derive the lower bound and upper bound using the Neyman-Pearson Lemma. Then, we derive the
certified poisoning size by requiring the lower bound to be larger than the upper bound. Next, we
derive the lower bound, the upper bound, and the certified poisoning size.
Deriving a lower bound of Pr(A(Y,x) = l): We first define the following residual:
δl = pl − (bpl · nkc)/nk. (21)
We define a binary function M(ω) = I(A(ω,x) = l) over the space Ω, where ω ∈ Ω and I is the
indicator function. Then, we have Pr(A(Y,x) = l) = Pr(M(Y ) = 1). Our idea is to construct a
subspace for which we can apply the first part of Lemma 1 to derive a lower bound of Pr(M(Y ) = 1).
We first divide the space Ω into three subspaces as follows:
B = {ω ∈ Ω|ω v D, ω 6v I}, (22)
C = {ω ∈ Ω|ω v D′, ω 6v I}, (23)
E = {ω ∈ Ω|ω v I}. (24)
Since we sample k training examples with replacement uniformly at random, we have the following:
Pr(X = ω) =
{
1
nk
, if ω ∈ B ∪ E
0, otherwise
(25)
Pr(Y = ω) =
{
1
(n′)k , if ω ∈ C ∪ E
0, otherwise
(26)
We denote by m the size of I, i.e., m = |I|. Then, we have the following:
Pr(X ∈ E) = (m
n
)k,Pr(X ∈ B) = 1− (m
n
)k, and Pr(X ∈ C) = 0. (27)
Pr(Y ∈ E) = (m
n′
)k,Pr(Y ∈ C) = 1− (m
n′
)k, and Pr(Y ∈ B) = 0. (28)
We have Pr(X ∈ E) = (mn )k because each of the k examples is sampled independently from I with
probability mn . Furthermore, since Pr(X ∈ B) + Pr(X ∈ E) = 1, we obtain Pr(X ∈ B) = 1− (mn )k.
Since X 6v D′, we have Pr(X ∈ C) = 0. Similarly, we can compute the probabilities in (28).
We assume pl − δl − (1− (mn )k) ≥ 0. We can make this assumption because we only need to find a
sufficient condition for h(D′,x) = l. We define B′ ⊆ E , i.e., B′ is a subset of E , such that we have
the following:
Pr(X ∈ B′) = pl − δl − Pr(X ∈ B) = pl − δl − (1− (m
n
)k). (29)
We can find such subset because pl − δl is an integer multiple of 1nk . Moreover, we define R as
follows:
R = B ∪ B′. (30)
Then, based on (2), we have:
Pr(A(X,x) = l) ≥ pl − δl = Pr(X ∈ R). (31)
Therefore, we have the following:
Pr(M(X) = 1) = Pr(A(X,x) = l) ≥ Pr(X ∈ R). (32)
Furthermore, we have Pr(X = ω) > γ · Pr(Y = ω) if and only if ω ∈ B and Pr(X = ω) =
γ · Pr(Y = ω) if ω ∈ B′, where γ = (n′n )k. Therefore, based on the definition ofR in (30) and the
condition (32), we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain the following:
Pr(M(Y ) = 1) = Pr(A(Y,x) = l) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ R). (33)
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Pr(Y ∈ R) is a lower bound of Pr(A(Y,x) = l) and can be computed as follows:
Pr(Y ∈ R) (34)
=Pr(Y ∈ B) + Pr(Y ∈ B′) (35)
=Pr(Y ∈ B′) (36)
=Pr(X ∈ B′)/γ (37)
=
1
γ
· (pl − δl − (1− (m
n
)k)), (38)
where we have (36) from (35) because Pr(Y ∈ B) = 0, (37) from (36) because Pr(X = ω) =
γ · Pr(Y = ω) for ω ∈ B′, and the last equation from (29).
Deriving an upper bound of maxj 6=l Pr(A(Y,x) = j): We define the following residual:
δj = (dpj · nke)/nk − pj ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l}. (39)
We leverage the second part of Lemma 1 to derive such an upper bound. We assume Pr(X ∈ E) ≥
pj + δj , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l}. We can make the assumption because we derive a sufficient
condition for h(D′,x) = l. For ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l}, we define Cj ⊆ E such that we have the
following:
Pr(X ∈ Cj) = pj + δj . (40)
We can find such Cj because pj + δj is an integer multiple of 1nk . Moreover, we define the following
space:
Qj = C ∪ Cj . (41)
Therefore, based on (2), we have:
Pr(A(X,x) = j) ≤ pj + δj = Pr(X ∈ Qj). (42)
We define a function Mj(ω) = I(A(ω,x) = j), where ω ∈ Ω. Based on Lemma 1, we have the
following:
Pr(M(Y ) = 1) = Pr(A(Y,x) = j) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ Qj), (43)
where Pr(Y ∈ Qj) can be computed as follows:
Pr(Y ∈ Qj) (44)
=Pr(Y ∈ C) + Pr(Y ∈ Cj) (45)
=1− (m
n′
)k + Pr(Y ∈ Cj) (46)
=1− (m
n′
)k + Pr(X ∈ Cj)/γ (47)
=1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
· (pj + δj). (48)
Therefore, we have:
max
j 6=l
Pr(A(Y,x) = j) (49)
≤max
j 6=l
Pr(Y ∈ Qj) (50)
=1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
·max
j 6=l
(pj + δj) (51)
≤1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
· (ps + δs), (52)
where ps + δs ≥ max
j 6=l
(pj + δj).
Deriving the certified poisoning size: To reach the goal Pr(A(Y,x) = l) > max
j 6=l
Pr(A(Y,x) = j),
it is sufficient to have the following:
1
γ
· (pl − δl − (1− (m
n
)k)) > 1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
· (ps + δs) (53)
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⇐⇒(n
′
n
)k − 2 · (m
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs) < 0. (54)
Taking all poisoned training datasets D′ (i.e., n− r ≤ n′ ≤ n+ r) into consideration, we have the
following sufficient condition:
max
n−r≤n′≤n+r
(
n′
n
)k − 2 · (m
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs) < 0. (55)
Note that m = max(n, n′) − r. Furthermore, when the above condition (55) is satisfied, we have
pl − δl − (1− (mn )k) ≥ 0 and Pr(X ∈ E) = (mn )k ≥ pj + δj ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l}, which are
the conditions when we can construct the spaces B′ and Cj . The certified poisoning size r∗ is the
maximum r that satisfies the above sufficient condition. In other words, our certified poisoning size
r∗ is the solution to the following optimization problem:
r∗ = argmax
r
r
s.t. max
n−r≤n′≤n+r
(
n′
n
)k − 2 · (max(n, n
′)− r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs) < 0. (56)
B Proof of Theorem 2
Our idea is to construct a learning algorithm A∗ such that the label l is not predicted by the bagging
predictor or there exist ties. When r > r∗ and δl = δs = 0, there exists a poisoned training dataset
D′ with a certain n′ ∈ [n− r, n+ r] such that we have:
(
n′
n
)k − 2 · (max(n, n
′)− r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps) ≥ 0 (57)
⇐⇒(n
′
n
)k − 2 · (m
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps) ≥ 0 (58)
⇐⇒1 + (n
′
n
)k − 2 · (m
n
)k ≥ pl − ps (59)
⇐⇒ 1
γ
· (pl − (1− (m
n
)k) ≤ 1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
· ps, (60)
where m = max(n, n′)− r and γ = (n′n )k. We let Qs = C ∪ C′s, where C′s satisfies the following:
C′s ⊆ E , C′s ∩ B′ = ∅, and Pr(X ∈ C′s) = ps. (61)
Note that we can construct such C′s because pl + ps ≤ 1. Then, we divide the remaining space
Ω \ (R ∪ Qs) into c − 2 subspaces such that Pr(X ∈ Qj) ≤ ps, where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l, s}.
We can construct such subspaces because pl + (c− 1) · ps ≥ 1. Then, based on these subspaces, we
construct the following learning algorithm:
A∗(ω,x) =
{
l, if ω ∈ R
j, if ω ∈ Qj (62)
Then, we have the following based on the above definition of the learning algorithm A∗:
Pr(A∗(X,x) = l) = Pr(X ∈ R) = pl (63)
Pr(A∗(X,x) = s) = Pr(X ∈ Qs) = ps (64)
Pr(A∗(X,x) = j) = Pr(X ∈ Qj) ≤ ps, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {l, s}. (65)
Therefore, the learning algorithm A∗ is consistent with (2). Next, we show that l is not predicted by
the bagging predictor or there exist ties when the training dataset is D′. In particular, we have the
following:
Pr(A∗(Y,x) = l) (66)
=Pr(Y ∈ R) (67)
=
1
γ
· (pl − (1− (m
n
)k)) (68)
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≤1− (m
n′
)k +
1
γ
· ps (69)
=Pr(Y ∈ Qs) (70)
=Pr(A∗(Y,x) = s), (71)
where γ = (n
′
n )
k and we have (69) from (68) because of (60). Therefore, label l is not predicted for
x or there exist ties when the training dataset is D′.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Based on the definition of SIMUEM and [20], we have:
Pr(pli ≤ Pr(A(g(D),xi) = li) ∧ pj ≥ Pr(A(g(D),xi) = j),∀j 6= li) ≥ 1−
α
e
(72)
Therefore, the probability that CERTIFY returns an incorrect certified poisoning size for a testing
example xi is at most αe , i.e., we have:
Pr((∃D′ ∈ B(D, rˆ∗i ), h(D′,xi) = yˆi)|yˆi 6= ABSTAIN) ≤
α
e
. (73)
Then, we have the following:
Pr(∩xi∈De((∀D′ ∈ B(D, rˆ∗i ), h(D′,xi) = yˆi)|yˆi 6= ABSTAIN)) (74)
= 1− Pr(∪xi∈De((∃D′ ∈ B(D, rˆ∗i ), h(D′,xi) = yˆi)|yˆi 6= ABSTAIN)) (75)
≥ 1−
∑
xi∈De
Pr((∃D′ ∈ B(D, rˆ∗i ), h(D′,xi) = yˆi)|yˆi 6= ABSTAIN) (76)
≥ 1− e · α
e
(77)
= 1− α (78)
We have (76) from (75) according to the Boole’s inequality.
D Derivation of Equation 7
L(n′) = (
n′
n
)k − 2 · (max(n, n
′)− r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs) (79)
We aim to derive argmaxn−r≤n′≤n+r L(n
′). When n− r ≤ n′ ≤ n, we have the following:
L(n′) = (
n′
n
)k − 2 · (n− r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs). (80)
Therefore, when n− r ≤ n′ ≤ n, L(n′) increases as n′ increases. Thus, L(n′) reaches its maximum
value when n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ r. When n ≤ n′ ≤ n+ r, we have the following:
L(n′) = (
n′
n
)k − 2 · (n
′ − r
n
)k + 1− (pl − ps − δl − δs). (81)
Moreover, we have:
∂L(x)
∂x
(82)
=
1
nk
· (k · xk−1 − 2 · k · (x− r)k−1) (83)
=
k · xk−1
nk
· (1− 2 · (1− r
x
)k−1). (84)
k·xk−1
nk
is larger than 0. Moreover, 1 − 2 · (1 − rx )k−1 decreases as x increases when x ≥ r and it
only has one root that is no smaller than r which is as follows:
xroot =
r
1− k−1
√
1
2
. (85)
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Therefore, we have ∂L(x)∂x > 0 when r ≤ x < r1− k−1√ 12 and
∂L(x)
∂x < 0 when x >
r
1− k−1
√
1
2
.
L(x) increases as x increases in the range [r, r
1− k−1
√
1
2
) and decreases as x increases in the range
( r
1− k−1
√
1
2
,+∞). Therefore, we have the following three cases:
Case I: When r ≤ n · (1 − k−1
√
1
2 ), L(n
′) reaches its maximum value at n′ = n since L(n′)
decreases as n′ increases in the range [n, n+ r].
Case II: When n · ( k−1√2 − 1) < r < n · ( k−1√2 − 1), L(n′) reaches its maximum value at
n′ = d r
1− k−1
√
1
2
e or b r
1− k−1
√
1
2
c since L(n′) increases as n′ increases in the range [n, r
1− k−1
√
1
2
] and
decreases as n′ increases in the range [ r
1− k−1
√
1
2
, n+ r].
Case III: When r ≥ n · ( k−1√2− 1), L(n′) reaches its maximum value at n′ = n+ r since L(n′)
increases as n′ increases in the range [n, n+ r].
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